Household Income Composition and Household Goods by Voynov, Ivan
IRISS at 
CEPS/INSTEAD
An Integrated Research 
Infrastructure in the Socio-Economic 
Sciences




IRISS WORKING PAPER SERIES
No. 2005-02
Please pay a visit to http://www.ceps.lu/irissIRISS-C/I
An Integrated Research Infrastructure in the 
Socio-Economic Sciences at CEPS/Instead, 
Luxembourg
What is IRISS-C/I?
IRISS-C/I is a visiting researchers’ programme at CEPS/INSTEAD, a policy and research centre 
based in Luxembourg. Its mission is to organise short visits of researchers willing to undertake 
empirical research in economics and other social sciences using the archive of micro-data 
available at the Centre.
In 1998, CEPS/INSTEAD has been identified by the European Commission as one of the few 
Large Scale Facilities in the social sciences, and, since then, IRISS-C/I fellowships offer 
researchers (both junior and senior) the opportunity to spend time carrying out their own 
research using the local research facilities. The expected duration of visits is in the range of 2 to 
12 weeks. 
During their stay, visitors are granted access to the CEPS/INSTEAD archive of public-use micro-
data (primarily internationally comparable longitudinal surveys on living conditions) and to 
extensive data documentation. They are assigned an office (shared or single) and have 
networked access to a powerful computation server that acts as host for the data archive and 
supports an array of commercial and open-source statistical software packages. Scientific and 
technical assistance is provided by resident staff. 
Research areas
Survey and panel data methodology; income and poverty dynamics; gender, ethnic and social 
inequality; unemployment; segmentation of labour markets; education and training; social 
protection and redistributive policies; impact of ageing populations; intergenerational relations; 
regional development and structural change. 
Additional information
IRISS-C/I
B.P. 48   L-4501 Differdange (Luxembourg)
Email: iriss@ceps.lu
Homepage: http://www.ceps.lu/irissHOUSEHOLD INCOME COMPOSITION AND HOUSEHOLD GOODS
by
Ivan V. Voynov




The paper focuses on the change in household income composition and the factors
that determine it. The results bring additional knowledge about household poverty
dynamics. Based on the collective approach to the family and the cooperative game
theory it is constructed theoretical model of household income composition change.
The change in income composition is a result from bargaining between household
members in attempt to defend the most suitable for them income source. Decisive
influence in the household income pattern bargaining have specific set of household
goods. Through empirical analysis of European Community Household Panel 2003
data it is proved that the adoption of definite income compositions (with prevailing
wages and salaries share and with prevailing social transfers share) is a result from the
availability of specific set of household goods.
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I. Introduction
At first glance the relationship between composition of household income and
household goods looks useless and insignificance for the household economics. But
the real aim of the paper is to draw attention on the income sources and their
importance for household economics. That is way the effort is directed toward
revealing the model of household income pattern and finding the factors that
influence it.
The essential task is to give answer of practical and important for the policy
making questions like: What induces households in European Union to sustain
specific income composition? Why part of them collect their income entirely from
wages and salaries, while other generate their income from social transfers? Are there
any social or economic factors that cause the adoption of one type of income pattern
over another? The answer of these questions can give considerable task upon the
efficiency of social policy decisions in EU countries.
In the recent papers on household economics a lot of attention is paid on the
earnings of members. The income of individual members becomes a crucial factor for
the intra-household allocation of resources. It is a crucial finding that allows us to
extend the reliability of economical approach upon the analysis of household. But that
research streamline diminishes another important feature of household income - the
type of the income sources and respectively the composition of household income.
 Actually the different types of income sources are well known but not enough
explored. It is mandatory index of the household income in every census but still
there is not clear assessment of its importance. Until the household income is treated
as a lump sum of money it is impossible to reveal the significance of income sources.
In this paper I stand to the idea of Bane, Ellwood
1 and Jenkins
2 that different
sources of household income affect the change in the household socio-economic
status. The entrance or ending in a certain socio-economic status (for example
poverty) depends not on change in the net sum of household income but on change in
the structure of household income sources. As a substantial part of the “income
                                                
1 Bane, M., D. Ellwood, Slipping Into and Out of Poverty: The Dynamics of Spells, NBER Working
Paper Series , №1193, 1983
2 Jenkins, S., Modelling Household Income Dynamics, ISER, 19983
events”
3 variation in income sources is the most reliable and significant factor of
household socio-economic change. The observation on the analyses concerning
poverty dynamics is made in Section 2.
The demonstration of household income pattern importance is a good starting
point but it inspires the more interesting question about the reasons of implementation
a definite income pattern over another. The answer of that question is the guiding line
through the entire paper. In order to give an answer of this question, there are several
theoretical obstacles to be overcome.
The purpose of Section 3 is to reveal the theoretical “background” of the
research. Its aim is to decompose the concrete set of interactions in the household that
lead to the “elaboration” of household strategy on income sources. The most
appropriate theoretical model is the economic approach to the family
4. The core
assumption is that household income pattern changes due to the change in individual
income sources. Based on the premise that the household is a community of
individuals that persuade their individual interests, we can assume that the income
pattern is a result from bargaining between household members. The household
decisions about income composition are result from bargaining between the
individual members income strategies. The economic approach and the cooperative
bargaining model specify the search for factors to the bargaining power of individual
members. Appropriate factors that cause change in the bargaining power of the
individuals are the household goods. Every good available in the household can be
identified as a “past income”, previous investment of the separate members. The
possession of private household goods is a powerful argument in the process of
choosing income pattern. That is the main idea on which is based the empirical model
of the analysis (Section 4).
The validity of theoretical model is checked by the analysis of the data from
European Community Household Panel (ECHP) from 2003 (Section 5).
                                                
3 Jenkins, S., Modelling Household Income Dynamics, ISER, 1998, p. 5
4 As a keystone of that approach are taken the works of G. S. Becker: Becker, G., E. Landes, R.
Michael, Economics of Marital Instability, NBER Working Papers Series №153, 1976; Becker, G.,
The Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way Of Looking at Behavior, The journal of political economy,
Volume 101, Issue 3, 1993; Becker, G., R. Barro, A Reformulation of The Economic Theory of
Fertility, NBER Working Papers Series , № 1793, 19864
II. Why household income pattern matter: the case of poverty
Basic assumption in this paper is that the household income is not just a lump
sum of money. If the household income is accepted only as a lump sum of money
then the different sources will have no importance. But the empirical evidences
clearly point that they really matter and hence the money are not the one and the only
manifestation of household income. There are many non-monetary features of
household income and income pattern is one of them.
The household income pattern or the household income composition is an
indicator that evaluates the share of different income sources in the net household
income. The income pattern is actually the ratio between the shares of different
sources of income in the net income.
Among the plenty examples for the importance of household income sources
the more convincing is the case of poverty dynamics. The research in that field
reveals the importance of income sources for entering/exiting in and out of poverty.
Most of the authors that are involved in this field confess that the poverty is
influenced much more from the change in the type of income sources than from the
variation in the net sum of household income. During the beginning and ending of
poverty there is not just intrusion in the net household income but a significant change
in the structure of income composition.
Bane and Ellwood undertake innovative approach to the poverty dynamics by
defining spells of poverty as the most adequate approach to its research. That
methodological innovation permits them to reveal the relationship between the
changes in income sources and the change in socio-economic status of household:
“Less than 40 percent of poverty spells beginnings seem to be caused by the
drop in heads earnings, while 60 percent of endings occur when the head’s
earnings increase.”
5
The demonstration of connection between income pattern and poverty
dynamics is not the only one achievement of that paper. Bane and Ellwood are the
first that proved the causal effect of the changes in household income pattern and the
dynamics of socio-economic status
6. There are specific events that change the family
                                                
5 Bane, M., D. Ellwood, Slipping Into and Out of Poverty: The Dynamics of Spells, NBER Working
Papers Series, №1193, 1983, p. 2
6 Ibid., p. 45
structure and “trigger” the beginning or ending of poverty - the decrease in head’s
earnings, wife’s earnings, others’ earnings or transfer income
7. A closer look at those
significant family changes reveals that actually they are changes in the household
income pattern. What is important is the “ownership” of the decreased earnings - it is
not important the exact sum of money reduced but the fact that decreasing happens
with the earnings of definite member. Obviously the ownership of income is an
important attribute of household earnings and in a certain cases it is the most
significant factor then the change in lump sum. That is why the decrease of head’s
wage causes important effect on household budget
8.
The division of net household income into head’s, wife’s or other member’s
income is the first case of recognition of the differences in the types of income
sources. The change in these different sources of income causes serious intrusion in
the household economics.
Another researcher that is interested in the relationship between household
income pattern and the socio-economic status of the family is S. Jenkins. He extends
the achievements of Bane and Ellwood by enlarging the group of specific factors that
influence the poverty dynamics. Instead of head's earnings he talks about “socio-
economic correlates of income and poverty dynamics“
9.
Based on the assumption that the sources of household income are the most
important part of net household income
10, he proves that the dynamics in the sources
of household income influence in a direct manner net household income. The change
in the types of income sources (the “income events”
11) inevitably shape net household
income and increase or decrease the probability of entering/ending into the poverty
spells. Unlike Bane and Ellwood, Jenkins clearly outlines the scope of events that
cause crucial influence on poverty dynamics. He includes not only the change in
head's labour earnings but the change in investment income, private and occupational
pension income, benefit income, private transfer income
12. The household income
                                                
7 Ibid., p. 10
8 Ibid., p. 2
9 Jenkins, S., Modelling Household Income Dynamics, ISER, 1998, p. 4
10 Ibid., p. 4
11 Ibid., p. 5
12 Ibid., pp. 35-376
variability depends on the change in income sources. The meaning of income sources
is irrefutably displayed through the evidence of its causal influence on household
poverty dynamics.
III. Theoretical model
The demonstration of the importance of income pattern is something very
important but it is not enough to answer the main question of this paper – why
different households support different income patterns? Or to put it in a more general
manner - which are the factors that cause adoption of one type of income pattern over
another?
All these questions will remain with no answer until we did not find an
appropriate theoretical framework for the analysis of household income decision.
  A. Income pattern and the economic approach
In order to find an answer I sustain the “collective” model approach to the
household economics. In the contemporary research it is a well established opinion
that the implementation of unitary model does not satisfy explanation of complex
family processes
13. Much more reliable is the collective model that perceives
household like community of individuals. From that point of view every process or
change in the household is based on the actions of individual members.
The “collective” approach to the household social and economic processes
rejects “unitary” model perception. The last one is based on the “black box”
14 idea -
household is taken as a homogeneous and totally coordinated organization with
automatic reactions on the environment challenges. For the followers of collective
approach the family is a community of individuals and every one of them acts upon
his/her own interest
15. Also the changes in the household are due to the own desires of
                                                
13 Browning, M., F. Bourguignon, P. Chiappori, V. Lechene, Income and Outcomes: A Structural
Model of Intrahousehold Allocation, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 102, №6, 1994, p.
1070
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individuals and it is a matter of active position to the environment rather than a
defending reaction to the surrounding events
16.
In the case of household income pattern that means to perceive two important
theoretical statements.
The first statement is that the household income is sum of individual incomes
and household income pattern is result from the summed individual’s shares of
different types of income. The household income pattern is a collective result from
the separate incomes of the household members. The choices of income type that
individual members make result in the common household income pattern. The total
share of wages in household income is the lump sum of wage income of all members.
It is the same with other income type: the share of social transfers is a result from the
social transfers that individual members receive. In other words, when we talk about
household income pattern we always talk about sum of individual’s income strategies.
The basis is the income pattern of the individual members of the household. The
common household income pattern is a generalization of the individual’s preferences.
The second statement is that the available income sources in the household
income are result from active position to the surrounding economic, political and
social events. The household members are able to predict harmful effects from the
environment and initiate the selection of such kind of income sources that will allow
them to diminish the negative effects. For comparison, the passive position in the
“unitary” approach pleads that the available income sources are a defensive reaction
to already done impacts on the household income. For the “collective” approach
individual choice of income source is the active position of individuals and not a
common automatic reaction of previous shocks.
The collective economic approach is based on two additional assumptions
which are important for the explanation of household income composition:
a) the maximizing behaviour of the separate individuals and
b) the equilibrium
17.
The economic approach to the family and partly the “collective” model of
explanation of household events, insists on the maximizing behaviour of the
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17 Ibid.+ o- 78
individuals
18. In the case of income pattern the maximizing behaviour is expressed in
the aspiration for achieving the most suitable for individual member income source. It
is easy to assume that every rational thinking member of the household is attempting
to gain the source of income that is most appropriate for his education, level of
desired job uncertainty and size of expected salary. That is why the maximizing
individual strategy for income source depends heavily on the existing skills and
qualification.
If the individual is very well educated and with significant experience in
certain field it is best for him to take the income source with the greatest level of
profit. His skills and experience will make him handle with risky situations in the
dynamic market situation. In that case the adoption of wage income pattern is a
maximizing behaviour.
If the individual is with poor educated and no practical experience, the
maximizing income pattern strategy for him will be the adoption of social transfer
income source. The social transfer’s income source has the lowest level of income
uncertainty, so that will be the best choice for people with no qualifications.
The maximizing approach to the individual income pattern is functional even
when the members are forced to respond to external events. There is no doubt that
unexpected and undesired events happen. But if we take family as composed from
individuals with rational thinking, we must confess that every impact from the social
environment has been analyzed and solved. The events that change the household
income components are result from rational strategy, result from carefully made
choice in order to “extract” the most profitable solution for the individual members.
In attempt to reduce the undesired consequences household members search for the
most profitable individual income pattern.
Even if the members have the opportunity to receive social transfers or
intergeneration transfers or even proposition for well paid job it is not obligatory to
take it. It is rather unconvincing to conclude that family members always take the
higher income proposal that emerges. They make the choice that best satisfies their
individual goals. Every member tries to take the most “suitable” for him income
source, depending on his education, professional experience, desires and expectations
for future development.
                                                
18 Dqlhrbg+  I-+ @m Dbnmnlhb @m`kxrhr ne Sgd E`lhkx+ Oqhmbdsnm Tmhudqrhsx Oqdrr+ 1//2+ p. 29
If the household income pattern is a result from individual earnings based on
the maximizing approach it is easy to predict conflicts with the other members of the
household (since they act on the same manner). From that point of view the existing
household income pattern is actually the point of balance between the members in the
household. It is a result from the income “strategy” of all household members. That
idea is very close to the Becker’s marriage “strategy”
19. If I have to extend it in more
general manner, most of the household events are result of “bargaining between the
family”
20.
In the case of household income composition every member tries to adopt the
“best” income for him. But to do that it has to bargain with the other members. If
he/she failure in the bargaining it is possible to be pushed to adopt income source
which is not “suitable” for him/her.
Proverbial example is the long stay in poverty - if all of the individuals in the
household have no qualification it will be natural each of them to prefer the social
transfers low risk income sources. But if no one of the adult members undertake
change in its individual income pattern that will push the entire family on a long term
periods of poverty. That is way the exit from poverty is a result from change in the
income pattern on one of the individuals in the family (in the most cases that is the
head of the family).
Obviously the final household income pattern is a result from complex and
ever changing process of decision making. The household members are in a situation
of permanent negotiation for the implementation of their own income strategies. That
is the most important moment in the “elaboration” of common household income
structure. The concrete household income composition depends on the possibilities
and skills of the separate individuals to thrust their strategies of income sources on
other members. Consequently it will be impossible to understand the household
income composition without knowledge on the process of elaboration of income
composition inside the household. That is why the main effort is to find the concrete
model of family decision-making.
                                                
19 Becker, G., E. Landes, R. Michael, Economics of Marital Instability, NBER Working Papers Series
№ 153, 1976
20 Dqlhrbg+  I-+ @m Dbnmnlhb @m`kxrhr ne Sgd E`lhkx+ Oqhmbdsnm Tmhudqrhsx Oqdrr+ 1//2+ p. 310
From the variety of scientific alternatives about the explanation of family
decision making there is two main alternatives – cooperative game theory and
noncooperative game theory.
  B. Income pattern and household decision-making
As it was pointed before, the aim of this paper is to reveal the factors that
influence household income pattern. To do that it is important to understand the
model of establishing common income composition. Based on the economic analysis
of the household life it is appropriate to assume that the final (common) income
composition is a result from a competition between individual income strategies.
Every one of the household member tries to defend its own income pattern, the
pattern that better fits his/her profit. It is a process of bargaining between household
members for the establishing of common (and ever changing) income composition.
Generally there are two theoretical concepts that deal with the decision
making in the household – noncooperative and cooperative game model. The first one
implies an inefficient output of the bargaining while the cooperative game ends with
efficient output
21.
Based on that common classification of the family bargaining models I accept
the cooperative bargaining model as much more reliable for the purpose of household
income composition elaborating. The reason is that in the most cases there is really
agreement between household members about the composition of common income.
Actually it is a marginal situation in which the household members did not succeed to
find a satisfying and efficient for all of them decision about the household income.
The failure to achieve common vision about the sources of household income is
connected with the stop pooling income effect. In exaggerate form the systematic
impossibility of household members to achieve effective outcome for the household
income bargaining will result in divorce. I prefer the cooperative bargaining model in
the explanation of income bargaining because of the simple fact that in the most cases
there is an effective output - the income pattern of the entire household.
A common feature of both cooperative and noncooperative approaches is the
“threat point”. Actually it is the hidden “engine” of income bargaining. It is the cross
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line between effective and ineffective bargaining output about the household income
pattern.
Consequently in the cooperative bargaining model (respectively the effective
output) it is important to define the “level” of threat point. According to Lundberg
and Pollak the threat point in the family bargaining is not a universal one
22. Beside the
fact that divorce is the most common case there are set of situation in which it is
inappropriate threat point:
“Divorce, we argue, should not be treated as the sole determinant of the threat
point for cooperative bargaining, in some situations, divorce is not possible
and in many other it is not the plausible threat. ... The separate spheres model
with its internal threat point implies that under some circumstances, the
couple's expenditure pattern will depend not on who receives income after
divorce but on who receives or controls income within marriage: that is,
couples do not pool their income”
23.
Based on that idea it is easy to point the most suitable “threat point” in the
case of income pattern bargaining - the cooperation will end at the moment when the
family members will stop pooling their income. That is the marginal point of income
bargaining. Behind it there is no household income pattern but individual income
strategy without coordination between them
24.
The “threat point” is important because it marks the resources the individual
members will have in the case of inefficient output. The "bargaining power"
25 of the
individuals is influenced by the accessible utilities in the case of inefficient outcome.
In this paper the "bargaining power" is very important because it measures the
influence of factors upon the final decision for household income pattern. The
bargaining power is proportional on the spouse’s utilities she/he can gate from the
bargaining output. The higher “threat point” of the spouse  (the more utilities he/she
can get at that marginal point) increases his/her bargaining power. The increased
power ensures better positions in the bargaining process which in turn results in
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23 Ibid.+ o- 18
24 Ibid.+ o- 17
25 Turocy, T., B. Stengel, Game Theory, CDAM Research Report LSE-CDAM-2001-0912
superior access to available utilities
26. Typical example is the case of divorce - the
share of earnings controlled by the husband affects the threat point which in turn is
decisive for the final division of the family properties
27.
In the case of household income pattern the level of the “threat point”
determines the bargaining power of the members. That is way the determinants of the
“threat point” are especially important. The change in the position of the “threat
point” defines the concrete values at which the efficient output will be accepted. In
other words the individual output from household income pattern bargaining depends
on the “threat point” determinants. The concrete shares of income sources for the
individual members will change in every variation of the bargaining “threat point”.
In the intra-household bargaining for allocation of resources the control over
the earnings specifies the “threat point” of the spouses and in turn it shapes the future
access to household goods
28. The threat point depends on the control over earnings.
But that model can be used in situations in which the bargaining is about the income.
Then the causal effect will be reversed - the threat point in the bargaining about the
income pattern will depend on the control over the existing household goods.
The reason to reverse that causal model is not accident. There are sufficient
theoretical arguments in doing that.
  C. Factors that determine household income pattern
The control over the household goods is a subject of matter only if we stand
on the collective approach to the household economics. Deriving from it we must
accept all available goods in the family as a result from the private earnings of
members. The available goods in the household are not result from common effort. If
we take a look at them in a long term period we can find the “history” of their
purchasing. That will be enough to reveal that every household good (entirely or in
prevailing part) is obtained by the individuals in the family.
The fact that the household goods are the “past income” of household
members is well known and a lot of researchers use it. The “connection” between
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family members and the household goods is analysed by P. Chiappori. He proves that
there is a sharp distinction between available goods based on their way of acquiring
and consumption. Generally there are two types of goods in the household - “private”
and “public”. The private one are gained and consumed in a rival way from the
members while the public goods are gained and consumed in a non-rival way
29. The
main criterion used for the classification is the way of consuming the household
goods. Similar classification is used by Becker. He argues that it will be important to
divide goods on two categories - “general capital” and “marriage-specific capital”.
The general capital (houses, automobiles, savings etc.) remain valuable for the
individuals even in the case of divorce
30. Unlike them the marriage-specific capital is
important only if the partners are together and is invaluable if they remain single
31. At
the same manner the criterion is based on the consumption significance of the goods.
That is way the goods are classified as valuable for the separate member (“private
goods”; “general capital”) or valuable for the entire household (“public goods”;
“marriage specific goods”).
In this paper I offer a slight different classification of the household
properties. They are not as important as a way of consumption but as a way of
acquirement.  It is not important the fact that they are valuable only for the separate
individual or only for the family as a whole. The most important is their way of
acquisition. Every available household good is a result from the private investment of
the separate individuals. The fact that the family can afford a holiday or having dinner
with friends every second day or live in its own house is always result from the
individual’s earnings. Hence the variance in the way of consumption of household
goods can not “erase” their origin.
The fact that the available goods are private investments of the individuals
during their family life is best illustrated by Becker:
“Married persons invest in many assets, including houses, children, market
and non-market skills and information. Some of these investments, such as in
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University, Department of economics, Discussion paper series № 191, 2004, p. 4
30 Becker, G., E. Landes, R. Michael, Economics of Marital Instability, NBER Working Papers Series
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31 Ibid., p. 2014
household appliance, automobiles, or knowledge of consumer prices, would
be almost as valuable to them if their marriage is dissolved ... The
accumulation of “general” capital does not affect the expected gain from
remaining married compared to dissolution, whereas the accumulation of
married-specific capital raises the expected gain because, by definition, this
capital is not valuable when single...”
32
Every "bit" of household goods is a result from individual efforts. The ability
of having dinner with friends every week, the possession of car, the significant
savings etc. are due to individual efforts of one of the family members.  That is way
every household goods is an “individual’s investment”. Despite the wide spread idea
that the available goods are common it is an irrefutable fact that they can be easy
identified and split up between individuals. A grave but eloquent example for such
identification of household goods is the division of family goods in the case of
divorce.
The fact that the household goods are the “past income” of the household
members is a reliable reason to put them as a factor in the bargaining about household
income pattern. In the same manner in which the present income of the individuals is
crucial about the allocation of goods between family members, the available
household goods (past income) are decisive about the choice of future income
sources.
The reason for that relationship is that the “past” incomes of the individual
member determine his/her treat point. The past incomes are the utilities he/she can
ever use in the case of ineffective bargaining output. Even if the household members
stop to pool their income they will proceed to use their past investment in household
goods. Actually every new investment in household good changes the individual’s
“threat point” and hence his/her bargaining power.
Consequently the contemporary bargaining for the income pattern depends on
the "past income" of the family members. The choice of contemporary income
sources depends on the past income investments of the members. During their family
life the individuals invest their earnings in different household goods and use it as an
argument in the bargaining about the household income pattern.
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Such a model is useful in the explanation of different decisions and choices
about the sources from which household generates its net income.
Generally the member who have substantial “past” income have bigger
bargaining power and therefore better chances to defend his/her desire for household
income source in the process of income pattern bargaining. While the household
member with lower “past” income has smaller bargaining power and lower chances to
defend his/her strategy for income sources. For example the member who succeeds to
ensure valuable good for the household (house, car, holiday etc.) has a significant
resource in past income that determine his/her “threat point”. That will not just
increase his bargaining power but will move the threat point for the other members of
the family. That is way in the bargaining for income source pattern they are in the
worst position.
In order to avoid the noncooperative output of the bargaining process the
member with lower bargaining power must undertake sufficient efforts. For
household income pattern establishment such effort is the adoption of income source
with higher earnings. That will restore the balance between bargaining powers of
household members and will continue the pooling of income in the household.
For the purposes of the paper it is used similar research design. From the
quality and the quantity of available household goods I try to find their influence on
the establishment of household income composition.
IV. Empirical model
As it was pointed at the beginning of the paper, there is a specific set of
household income sources which is important for the poverty dynamics – income
from wages and salaries and income from social transfers. That is the reason to
constrain the research on household income composition upon two specific types of
income pattern: (a) household income pattern with prevailing share of wages and
salaries and (b) household income pattern with prevailing share of social transfers.
The data used in the empirical model is from European Community Household Panel
(ECHP) household file, wave 7 (2003).
It is obvious that those two patterns are just part of the possible income
compositions – with prevailing share of self employment; with prevailing share of
rental, capital and private transfer income etc. Consequently the research will not give16
answers of the questions about the factors that generally determine the choice of one
household income over another. Its results can be used for important improvement in
the explanation of poverty dynamics.
To solve the main research problem about the factors that define the specific
household income composition it was build linear model with dependent variables
household income patterns and independent variables household goods (including
variables about the financial situation of the family, accommodation features, durable
goods and children). As additional independent variables in the model are included
variables about the demographic situation of the household. The reason is that as a
rule household income composition is dependent from the number and the age of
household members and the inclusion of such variables will increase the fit of the
models.
In order to build the model are taken a number of steps. They are as follows:
1. It is necessary to calculate the share of the two specific income sources in
the total household income:
where:
•  Iws is the share of wages and salaries in the net household income,
•  HI111 is the wage and salary earnings in ECHP data,
•  HI100 is the total net household income in ECHP data.
where:
•  Ist is the share of social transfers in the net household income,
•  HI130 is the total social transfers received in ECHP data,
•  HI100 is the total net household income in ECHP data.
2. The use of new variables as dependent variables in multiple regression model is
limited because of the strong assumption about their distribution
33. Since the results
                                                

























rejected the hypothesis about normal distribution of the two income source variables
it is not possible to use them in regression model. In order to solve the problem they
were transformed into binary variables. Such transformation diminishes the scope of
conclusions to two household income patterns:
•  income composition with predominance of wages and salaries share,
•  income composition with predominance of social transfers share.
The variable for prevailing wages income pattern (PIws) has the following
levels:
  1 – household income composition is based entirely (Iws  ≥ 90%) on wages and
salaries,
 0 – income composition is not based entirely (Iws < 90%) on wages and salaries.
The second binary variable (PIst) marks household income pattern with
predominant share of social transfers. It has the levels:
1 – household income composition is based entirely (Ist ≥ 90%) on social transfers,
0 – income composition is not based entirely (Ist < 90%) on social transfers.
3. The liner models that estimate the influence of household goods and demographic
factors on household income composition are based on the logistic regression model
since the two dependent variables are binary:
where:
ln is the natural algorithm,
pPIj is the probability that the events PIws or PIst occurs (PIj=1),
pPIj /(1- pPIj) is the odds ratio,
ln[pPIj /(1- pPIj)] is the log odds ratio,
α is the coefficient on constant term,
β1, β2, β3, βn are the coefficients of change in the log odds ratio for a
unit increase in the independent variable,
X1, X2, X3, Xn are the independent variables including household
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 goods and household demographic variables,
ε is the error term.
Another feature of the empirical model is that each one of the models is
calculated for the fifteenth EU countries. The reason is that it is hardly to accept the
assumption for insignificant differences between countries in the field of household
income. That is the starting point for the interpretation of result. Below are analyzed
only those factors which are significant for the most country models.
Another important feature is that for the purposes of better explanation I
propose two adult spouses household model. The simpler model can better express the
nature of the analysed process. From that point of view it is necessary to say that the
establishment of every one of the predominant household income patterns is result
from the earning of the both spouses.
V. Data analysis
Before the analysis of result there is one more thing to be clarified. The fact
that the data is collected and organized for the whole household doesn’t mean that the
analysis is based on the “unitary model” approach to the household economics. Using
such kind of data with “bargaining model” of household income pattern can reveal the
importance of household goods for the entire household income.
  Income composition with prevailing share of wages and salaries
The results from Table 1 show that all fifteen models are significant at the
0,001 level according to the Model chi-square statistic. In three of the models
Nagelkerke R
2 is higher than 0,500 (Belgium = 0,512; Greece = 0,512 and Ireland =
0,566). The lowest level of Nagelkerke R
2 is in Netherlands model (0,293). As it was
pointed before, a subject of analysis will be only those factors which have significant
unstandardized logit coefficient in most of the country models. Such restriction is a
good basis for achieving more reliable conclusion. The aim is to find common factors
beside the country differences.
The fist household factor in Table 1 which has a significant influence in most
of the country models is the ability of household to afford paying for holiday. It is
significant for the models of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Netherlands,19
Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom. With one exception (Portugal: b= -0,22) the
fact that the household can afford paying for holiday increases the log odds of
establishing household income composition with prevailing share of wages and
salaries. The interpretation of that relationship can be directed to the upper theoretical
model. The possibility of having holiday is due to the individual earnings of one of
the spouses. The amount of money exceeded and spent for the rest of the whole
household is a strong argument toward changing the bargaining power of the partner
who brings it. In such situation the “threat point” of such partner is in a position to
increase its bargaining power. For the other partner it slows down the possibility of
defending his/her income choice. That situation constricts his/her possibilities to
choose about the income sources. If the choice is between wages source income and
social transfers source income there is a little probability to choose the second one.
Due to the lower bargaining position and in order to avoid inefficient bargaining
outcome he/she will have to choose the wage income source. As a final result the
household income composition is predominantly influenced by wages and salaries.
The second household factor in Table 1 which has a significant influence in
most of the country models is the ability of saving many. It is significant for the
models of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom. With one exception
(Greece: b= -0,45) the availability to saved money increases the log odds of adoption
household income composition with prevailing share of wages. Deriving from the
theoretical model, the possibility of saving money after all household expenditures is
a result from the higher earnings of one of the spouses. Similarly to the previous
factor such situation diminishes dramatically the bargaining power of the spouse that
income doesn’t allow saving money. At the same time the bargaining power of the
partner whose income permits money savings increased. Appropriate decision of that
problem in order to avoid ineffective outcome is the establishing of wage earning for
the second partner. The result is adoption of household income pattern with prevailing
of wages and salaries.
The availability of significant savings (1000 euro or more) from consuming
food from own agriculture or gardening (Table 1) is significant factor for the models
of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. In all of
these countries it decreases the log odds of establishing income composition with20
prevailing share of wages. Such relationship is natural since the significant savings
from own agriculture exclude prevailing income composition from wages and
salaries. The same interpretation is relevant and for the availability of significant
savings (1000 euro or more) from consuming other goods from own company (Table
1). It is significant for the models of Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal and Spain. It decreases the log odds of establishing income
composition with prevailing share of wages.
Another group of factors that influence the probability of establishing wages
and salaries income pattern is concerned with the household dwelling. The results
from Table 1 show that features of the dwelling like a place to sit outside does matter.
It is a significant factor for the models of Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden and United Kingdom. With one
exception (Portugal: b= 0,24) in all these models the lack of place to sit outside
increases the log odds of establishing household pattern with prevailing share of
wages and salaries. The fact that the household lives in apartment (not in a house)
increases probability both parents to receive earnings from wages. The influence of
that fact upon the probability of dependant event to occur is closely related with the
influence of two other factors from the same kind: the shortage of space and
possession of second home. The shortage of space of the accommodation is
significant factor for the models of Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands,
Portugal and Spain. In all these models the shortage of space of the accommodation
increases the log odds of adopting predominantly wages and salaries income pattern.
The possession of second house is significant for the models of Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom.
Similarly to the shortage of space, the lack of second home increases the log odds of
establishing household income pattern with prevailing share of wages and salaries.
Generally the lack of place to sit outside, the shortage of space and the lack of
second home increase the log odds of establishing household income pattern with
predominance of wages and shares. Such relationships can be interpreted using the
theoretical model. The lack of comfortable dwelling for the household is due to the
insufficient earnings of both spouses. It is a specific situation that slows down the
bargaining power of both partners. The choice of social transfers income source of
any one of them will doom him/her to lower bargaining power in future. That is way21
the optimal choice of both partners is to sustain wages income composition. If the
household is living in comfortable dwelling, according to the theoretical model, it is
result from the earnings of one of the spouses. Such an important for the whole family
good can allow the spouse that “delivers” it in the household to defend its own choice
of income source. But if such important good is missing then both partners should
work in order to save their own bargaining power.
The results from Table 1 show that the possession of car has a significant
effect on the models for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. The possession of car in the
household increases the log odds of establishing household income composition with
prevailing share of wages and salaries. The same relationship can be found and for the
possession of VCR – its availability increases the log odds of adopting wages and
salaries income composition. That relationship is significant for all fifteen country
specific models.
There is another similar relationship in Table 1. The possession of home
computer increases the log odds of implementing prevailing wages and salaries
income in the models for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.
The explanation of these relationships is similar to the explanation of the
influence of the ability of paying for holiday. All they are available through the
personal income effort of one of the spouses. That certainly changes the balance of
bargaining power between partners. The most appropriate effort toward preventing
the end of income pooling in the household is the adoption of higher income pattern
than social transfers.
The importance of these household goods for the establishment of certain
household income pattern is confirmed from two other relationships that can be found
in the results from Table 1.
The lack of colour TV increases the log odds of establishing wages and
salaries predominant household pattern in the models for Austria, Belgium, France,
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. The same type of influence
has the lack of telephone in the models for Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom. It is another marginal case of the
effect of household goods upon the choice of income pattern. The availability of these22
goods is not enough to cause intrusion in the bargaining power of the both partners.
Consequently there is no effort for restoring the bargaining power equilibrium
through adopting wage income type. The reason is that they are not valuable goods
for the household. Since they are basic needs their possession in the case when “threat
point” is reached will bring no advantage for the possessor. At the same time the lack
of such basic goods in the household threats the bargaining power of both spouses and
they had to work in order to ensure them.
The last significant factor for the model of establishing wage prevailing
household income pattern is the existence of children under twelve years. They are
significant factor in the models for Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and United Kingdom. In all of these models the
children under twelve increase the log odds of establishing wages predominant
income pattern. The children under twelve are specific kind of household “good”.
There is no doubt that as a spend time, money and other resources they are investment
of the individual household member. Beside the help of all members in their care
there is a crucial effort of one of the spouses. According to such point of view the
situation become very similar to the previously discussed. In attempt to gain
equilibrium with the bargaining power of the other partner it is rather probable for the
second one to adopt wage type of income source.
  Income composition with prevailing share of social transfers
The results from Table 2 show that all fifteen models are significant at the 0,001 level
according to the Model chi-square statistic. In all models the Nagelkerke R
2 statistics
is over 0,500 and in three of them it is over 0,700 (Ireland = 0,790; Portugal = 0,760
and Spain = 0.733).
The results from Table 2 reveal the first significant for most of the country
models factor – paying for holiday outside home. It is significant in the models of
Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom. The fact
that the household can afford paying for holiday decreases the log odds of
establishing household income pattern with prevailing share of social transfers. The
interpretation of that relationship is closely related with the interpretation of the
relationship between that factor and the establishing of wages prevailing household
income composition. The direction of relationship is just the opposite. The existing of23
household good like ability of paying for holiday increases the probability of adopting
wages prevailing household pattern and decreases the chances of establishing
household composition with prevailing share of social transfers. The mechanism of
such relationships is explained in the terms of intra-household bargaining for income
pattern. The empirical prove for the opposite influence of that factor upon both
household income patterns is an evidence for the reliability of the theoretical model
used in this paper.
Such opposite influence of household goods upon both types of income
composition can be found in seven more factors.
The fact that there is money saved in the household (Table 2) is meaningful
for most of the country models. It is significant in the models for Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom. The ability
of saving money decreases the log odds of establishing household income
composition with prevailing share of social transfers.
Another common factor from Table 2 is the shortage of space of the
accommodation. It is significant in the models for Austria, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Netherlands and Portugal. With one exception (Portugal = 0,4) the
shortage of space decreases the log odds of establishing household income
composition with prevailing share of social transfers.
The possession of car (Table 2) in the household decreases the log odds of
adoption social transfers with prevailing household patterns. It is significant for the
models of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
Another opposite factor influence according to the probability of establishing
household income with prevailing share of wages and salaries is the possession of
colour TV (Table 2). It is significant factor for the models of Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and
Sweden. The fact that household possess colour TV increases the log odds of
establishing household composition with prevailing share of social transfers. The
possession of such basic household good (due to the individual’s effort of one of the
partners) can not threat the bargaining power of the other spouse and he/she can
afford to choose lower but safer income from social transfers.
The possession of more valuable household goods than color TV set increase24
the discrepancy in the “past” income of both spouses and leads to serious intrusion in
the bargaining power equilibrium of the partners. That is way their availability in the
household diminishes the probability of establishing social transfers predominant
income pattern. Such valuable household goods are VCR, home computer and
children below twelve.
Possession of VCR (Table 2) is a significant factor for the models of Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. Its availability in the household
decreases the log odds of establishing household income with prevailing share of
social transfers.
The same relationship is found in the analysis of the influence of home
computer in the household (Table 2). It decreases the log odds of establishing social
transfers prevailing income composition for the models of Austria, Belgium, Finland,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden
and United Kingdom.
The last factor that influences most of the country models in Table 2 is the
existence of children below twenty years in the household. It is significant factor for
the models of Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. The fact that the other partner has enough
resources to ensure child care threats the bargaining power of the second spouse. In
such situation he / she can not afford to receive money from social transfers.
  Main findings
The main findings from the data analysis can be summarised in few points:
z  There are big differences in the liner model depending on the separate countries.
That is why it is more precise to speak about significant difference then for
common factors. That is an important conclusion for future research in household
income composition. Obviously the factors that determine household income
pattern are specific for every country.
z  There are a certain groups of household goods factors which are specific for the
separate household income patterns.
z  The most important result is that the same household goods that increase the log
odds of establishing household income pattern with predominance of wages share25
decrease the log odds of adoption of household income with prevailing share of
social transfers.
z  That specific set of household goods includes:
•  The ability of the household to afford paying for a week’s annual holiday
away from home.
•  The existence of money left to spend.
•  The shortage of space in the household’s accommodation.
•  The possession of a car.
•  The possession of a VCR.
•  The possession of colour TV.
•  The possession of telephone.
•  The possession of home computer.
•  Children under twelve years in the household.
z  The interpretation of that fact is a starting point for another research but the
theoretical model in this paper can be used for drawing explanation framework.
Obviously the substantial discrepancy between the “past” incomes of the spouses
is good enough motivation for establishing household income pattern based on
wages and salaries. The lack of such discrepancy increases the probability of
establishing household income pattern based on social transfers. The differences
between the “past” incomes of both partners are a decisive point for establishing
one household income composition over another.
Conclusion
Based on Becker's economic approach, it is clear that the household income
pattern is not a unitary, automatic strategy of the entire household. Rather it is the
final result from prolonged struggle between household members in attempt to defend
their own interest. There is an obvious or hidden bargaining between the income
pattern strategies of the individual household members. In that process household
goods have decisive influence over the bargaining outcome.
Based on the information about the household goods it is much more ease to
calculate the probability of establishing one income composition over another. There
is a specific group of household goods that stimulates the adoption of one household
income pattern over another. Generally the aim of the paper is to stress on the intra-26
household processes that affect the household poverty dynamics. The change in the
household income pattern is part of the “income events”
34 that influence the
household poverty dynamics.
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Table 1: Model estimates of the probability of household income composition with prevailing share of wages and salaries.
AUT BEL DNK FIN FRA DEU GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT ESP SWE UK
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Table 1 (continued): Model estimates of the probability of household income composition with prevailing share of wages and salaries.
AUT BEL DNK FIN FRA DEU GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT ESP SWE UK
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Table 1 (continued): Model estimates of the probability of household income composition with prevailing share of wages and salaries.
AUT BEL DNK FIN FRA DEU GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT ESP SWE UK
Does the dwelling have heating or
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Table 1 (continued): Model estimates of the probability of household income composition with prevailing share of wages and salaries.
AUT BEL DNK FIN FRA DEU GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT ESP SWE UK

















































































































































Total 2644 2572 2281 3104 5345 5693 3918 1951 6052 2373 5008 4633 5132 5239 4841
1179,06 1188,61 372,28 1231,81 1803,25 2050,10 1894,68 997,85 2417,61 870,12 1243,47 2000,62 2095,69 2076,85 1815,00
22 23 15 25 25 17 23 19 21 15 21 31 23 10 19
Model Chi-Square
df
Sig. 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001
Cox & Snell R Square 0,36637 0,38410 0,22395 0,33084 0,28679 0,31235 0,38432 0,42514 0,33188 0,30824 0,22028 0,35226 0,33780 0,30731 0,32372
Nagelkerke R Square 0,48850 0,51213 0,29861 0,44112 0,38239 0,41647 0,51243 0,56685 0,44251 0,41099 0,29370 0,46968 0,45040 0,40975 0,43162
Notes:
The number in brackets is the S.E. of the unstandardized  logit coefficient.
* is level of significance p ≤ 0,05
** is level of significance p ≤ 0,01.32
Table 2: Model estimates of the probability of household income composition with prevailing share of social transfers.
AUT BEL DNK FIN FRA DEU GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT ESP SWE UK
Demographic information



















































































Can the household afford keeping its























Can the household afford replacing





Can the household afford buying new,










Can the household afford eating meat or










Can the household afford having friends














Has the household been unable to pay
scheduled rent for accommodation










Table 2 (continued): Model estimates of the probability of household income composition with prevailing share of social transfers.
AUT BEL DNK FIN FRA DEU GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT ESP SWE UK
Has the household been unable to pay
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-0,22 **
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Table 2 (continued): Model estimates of the probability of household income composition with prevailing share of social transfers.
AUT BEL DNK FIN FRA DEU GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT ESP SWE UK
Does the accommodation have shortage
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Table 2 (continued): Model estimates of the probability of household income composition with prevailing share of social transfers.
AUT BEL DNK FIN FRA DEU GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT ESP SWE UK



































































Total 2644 2572 2281 3104 5345 5693 3918 1951 6052 2373 5008 4633 5132 5239 4841
1878,08 1645,97 1632,88 2142,94 3402,06 3341,23 2768,35 1631,73 4263,15 1659,12 3323,30 3890,54 4058,68 3080,93 3224,31
18 20 12 21 23 14 25 15 24 11 22 23 20 10 18
Model Chi-Square
df
Sig. 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001
Cox & Snell R Square 0,51751 0,48429 0,51395 0,50088 0,47146 0,45005 0,50771 0,59278 0,51007 0,50536 0,48748 0,57023 0,54997 0,42008 0,50137
Nagelkerke R Square 0,69001 0,64572 0,68527 0,66784 0,62861 0,60007 0,67695 0,79038 0,68009 0,67381 0,64997 0,76030 0,73329 0,56011 0,66849
Notes:
The number in brackets is the S.E. of the unstandardized  logit coefficient.
* is level of significance p ≤ 0,05
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